Prof. Dr Gordana Đurović, Professor at the University of Montenegro and President of the Montenegrin Pan-European Union
Can Montenegro turn its European dream into membership by 2028?
At a moment when Montenegro’s European agenda finds itself at one of its most sensitive turning points, the question is no longer whether, but how quickly and to what standard the country can complete the accession process. After more than two decades since the beginning of the integration path and nearly 14 years of negotiations, the ambitious “28 by 2028” goal appears attainable, but by no means guaranteed. In an interview with Diplomacy and Commerce Montenegro magazine, Prof. Dr Gordana Đurović former Minister for European Integration and President of the Montenegrin Pan-European Union analyses the current pace of reforms, the political tensions that are slowing the process, and the broader geopolitical context shaping Brussels’ attitude toward enlargement. Her message is clear: the key to success no longer lies in plans, but in political maturity, institutional stability, and the capacity to pursue the European path as a shared national project.
As a former Minister for European Integration (and the first Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro for European Integration) ,1 how do you assess the pace and quality of Montenegro’s accession process today?
We have been on the path of European integration for a long time formally, one could say, since the year 2000 and the Zagreb Summit. We began substantive negotiations in June 2012. Everything accelerated with the definitive receipt, in June 2024, of a positive report on the fulfilment of the interim benchmarks for the rule-of-law cluster, at which point the conditions were met for the chapter-closure process to continue. It was then that the ambitious and appealing motto “Montenegro 28#28” was launched the idea that Montenegro would become the 28th member of the EU by 2028. In the meantime, matters have grown more complex, both at home, in the EU, and on the global stage. Although we had planned considerably more, from that point to the present, we have closed only eleven chapters; fourteen negotiating chapters in total have been provisionally closed. Our plan means that by the end of the year, we must close a further nineteen negotiating chapters, as well as negotiate the terms of accession under Chapter 34 EU Institutions. In brief: at home, the pace of legislative reform is not proceeding entirely to plan, and the adoption of amendments to legislation in the fields of internal affairs and national security which were not accompanied by a “blue flag” provoked sharp disagreement from part of the opposition and a withdrawal from the chairmanships of important parliamentary committees. Both sides, and the ruling coalition in particular, must demonstrate goodwill as soon as possible and endeavour to restore the situation to normality, for there is no time to spare. This means that the Law on Personal Data Protection must be adopted without delay and that the previously amended legislation must be harmonised with the General Data Protection Regulation. Only then could the return of the largest opposition party to the full-capacity work of Parliament be expected. One should not underestimate the fact that these political upheavals are visible all the way to Brussels to the Commission, the European Parliament, and the member states. This confuses those who wish to see a strong pro-European bloc in the country and unity on this path. Discord and blockades on the domestic political scene play into the hands of sceptical member states that remain reserved about providing full support to Montenegro and consequently defer the adoption of certain important decisions that ought to be taken in our favour. This places the planned conclusion of the negotiating process at risk and raises many questions. On the other hand, cohesion within the EU itself particularly in the context of an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, systemic uncertainty, and the difficulty of reaching agreement on key decisions in the field of foreign and security policy means that part of the attention is, by the nature of things, directed to other priorities. Consequently, if we are not sufficiently visible and do not deliver good results, we will certainly not be a priority in decision-making. Nevertheless, the greater part of the responsibility lies with us, and we should not blame the Commission and the EU if plans are not realised. There is still time for 28#28, but time is inexorably running out.
To what extent is the closure of negotiating chapters particularly Chapter 21 a genuine indicator of progress, and to what extent a formal step forward without full implementation in practice?
It would be well if the closure of Chapter 21, on the trans-European energy and transport networks, could soon be followed by the closure of the chapters on energy and on transport. And that we simultaneously close other chapters that integrate us into the EU single market, such as the free movement of goods, the free movement of persons, competition and state aid, financial services, food safety, health and consumer protection, and an aligned customs policy. There we have easily arrived at the magic number nine. Were we to complete this by summer, we would then have 10 of the most demanding chapters remaining before December 2026. (Let us recall that, for example, Croatia likewise closed ten chapters in the second half of 2009.) Given that this is a key national project, I still believe it is possible. But these months through to the end of July 2026 will reveal the degree of realism of these projections.
To what extent do institutional stability and the political context affect Montenegro’s credibility in the negotiating process?
Institutional stability across all three branches of government is of great importance, particularly at this stage of integration. There are many instruments used to monitor and assess this. Ultimately, we report on it, debate it at considerable length, and listen to the statements of officials and analysts, both domestically and in the region and the Union. There can be no integration without the required threshold of institutional stability and measurable results of institutional functioning. The political context is likewise a mirror of our European agenda. All parties that deviate from the legislative plan set out in the Accession Programme, as well as those that insist on priorities other than those of the EU agenda, are impediments to the process and jeopardise the national project.
How do you see the role of civil society and the expert public in the European integration process today, compared with the period when you led this portfolio?
The role of civil society and the expert public in the European integration process today remains important. Still, in certain respects, it differs from the period before the attainment of candidate-country status. In that “preceding” period, the European integration process was new and a political priority for the youngest member of the United Nations, and civil society accordingly played a strong role in mobilising and educating. At the same time, the expert public participated significantly in drafting strategic documents and in harmonising legislation. The civil sector was a partner and driver of reform, rather than a critic. Today, the situation is more complex. Civil society is more professionalised and possesses stronger expertise. It has a clear focus on monitoring reforms and raises its voice for transparency and accountability in institutions. The critique of civil society is sharper today and this in circumstances in which there is a risk to the political consensus on EU integration, because one part of the political spectrum has an “emotional” relationship with neighbouring countries and argues that accession should not take place without them. The number of civil society organisations has accordingly increased significantly. Yet the civil sector’s periodic diminished influence on decision-making is evident, further eroding public trust in the process itself. This means that today civil society and the expert public have a more mature but also more demanding role: less to promote the integration process itself, and more to serve as critics of the insufficient and non-transparent work of certain institutions and to exercise oversight over them. Their role is therefore crucial to preserving the credibility of reforms, accelerating the accession process, and strengthening democratic standards. The EU recognises the importance of civil society today and supports its voice.
Do you consider that Montenegro’s citizens sufficiently understand the concrete benefits of EU membership, or is a stronger communication strategy needed?
The citizens of Montenegro do not sufficiently understand the benefits of Union membership understanding is partial and uneven, and a stronger, targeted communication strategy is therefore needed. This means in particular: clear messages directed at vulnerable groups, and especially at young people; the dismantling of stereotypes regarding strict EU standards in all spheres of life; and the declaration of war on all disinformation and manipulation.
In the context of geopolitical challenges and EU enlargement, where do you see the position of the Western Balkans and of Montenegro in the coming years?
It would certainly be best for our country to become a full member of the EU as soon as possible, and thereby also to help ensure that the positive spillover effect of the benefits of integration that Montenegro will experience is reflected in support for the process, the dynamics of reform, and the very dynamics of accession in all the countries of the region. Within the EU, an agreement may yet be reached on revising the 2020 accession methodology, which would then accelerate the process in the early phases of negotiations. But the accession criteria must certainly not be abandoned, for in that case the accession process would lose its meaning and would amount to mere political decisions that would lead more to the disintegration than to the integration of the bloc.
How critical are reforms in the fields of the rule of law and consumer protection for the acceleration of negotiations and genuine integration into the European system?
Consumer protection and the public health of all EU citizens within the single market are very important common policies of the EU, and Montenegro is very close to meeting the benchmarks and closing this negotiating chapter. The rule of law is the theme with which the process began and will end we hope by December 2026. A good deal will remain and find its place in the Accession Treaty and the transitional provisions. And this, too, we will have to fulfil, for without it there will be no accession date.
How does the Pan-European Union contribute to the strengthening of European values and political dialogue in the region?
Through work with young people as a key target group, as well as through projects that focus on Montenegro’s integration into common EU policies, such as the common market, EU cohesion policy, mobilising funds for the green agenda, and related areas. Research findings are published and presented publicly. We promote Montenegro at Pan-European conferences across Europe, where we endeavour to expand the network of Pan-Europeans who support our European path.
Is there a risk of “enlargement fatigue” within the EU, and how might this affect the dynamics of Montenegro’s negotiations?
Enlargement fatigue is a phenomenon identified immediately after the major enlargement of 2004, particularly after the rejection of the Constitution for Europe in 2005. On the other hand, in the enlargement countries, there is a form of fatigue with the “commitment to integration” that never materialises into membership. This naturally affects the dynamics of the integration process, particularly as new risks Europe and the EU face today emerge.
In your view, what would be the key next step that would bring Montenegro closer to full membership of the European Union?
The key next step for Montenegro toward full EU membership is not merely the formal closure of chapters, but the accelerated and credible implementation of reforms in the field of the rule of law, together with that essential part of electoral reform that we must complete for the next elections to be conducted regularly. Finally, it is very important that results along the integration path are not promoted merely as the achievement of one or more parties, but rather presented as the result of a national project supported by the entire society. In other words, the energy of integration must not be confused with the early phase of a pre-election campaign for next year’s parliamentary elections.